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When Supply Meets Demand: Wage Inequality in Portugal
* 
 
Wage inequality in Portugal increased over the last quarter of century. The period from 1982 
to 1995 witnessed strong increases in both upper- and lower-tail inequality. A shortage of 
skills combined with skill-biased technological changes are at the core of this evolution. Since 
1995, lower-tail inequality decreased, while upper-tail inequality increased at a slower rate. 
The supply of high-skilled workers more than doubled during this period, contributing 
significantly to the slowdown. Polarization of employment demand is the more credible 
explanation for the more recent evolution. As in other developed economies, for instance 
Germany and the United States, we show that institutions played a minor role in shaping 
changes in inequality. 
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The debate over the level and trends in wage inequality in developed economies has evolved
around a continental divide. Anglo-Saxon countries have higher and increasing inequality
throughout the 80s and 90s (Card and Lemieux 2001, Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008), while,
in Continental Europe, it is smaller and increased much less. Recently this view has been chal-
lenged with the reassessment of inequality developments for Germany in Dustmann, Ludsteck
and Sch¨ onberg (2009), pointing to signiﬁcant increased inequality throughout that period.
The main explanations for the rising wage inequality in the US in the 80s are the skill-biased
technological change matched with a slower pace of expansion in the labor supply of the high-
skilled. In the 90s, the wage distribution was shaped by the market polarization, resulting in
falling inequality at the lower-tail of the income distribution and increasing inequality at the
upper-tail. In Europe, the continuous rise in the supply of high-skilled individuals and labor
market institutions that contribute to the compression of the wage distribution (minimum wage,
wage-setting through collective bargaining, and unions) are frequently advanced as the main
explanations for the lower level and more contained increase in inequality.
Portugal appears as an outﬁt for the institutional view. Indeed, Portugal shares the in-
stitutional features of Continental Europe, but has the inequality outcomes of Anglo-Saxonic
countries. We reconcile the Portuguese outcome with the European experience in the context
of the supply, demand, and institutions framework.
This paper visits the changes in the wage structure in Portugal between 1982 and 2006.
Throughout the 80s and until the mid-90s, wage inequality increased steeply at both ends of
the wage distribution. The subsequent period tells a diﬀerent story, with wage inequality falling
at the lower-tail and slowing down at the upper-tail. Supply and demand shifts explain most
of these developments. The supply of skills remained quite low during the ﬁrst period, but a
large shift occurred during the 90s, with an increase in college graduates. The shifts in demand
throughout this period favored the more skilled, but since 1995 we observe a polarization of
the wage distribution, with both employment and wages increasing more in the lower- and
upper-tail.
The institutional framework of the Portuguese labor market did not change much through-
out this period. The basic regulations of collective bargaining, minimum wage, and ﬁxed-term
contracts were already in place before 1982. However, labor relationships went through signif-
2icant changes. The starting years of our sample mark the end of the “revolutionary period”
that started with the deposition of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974. Indeed, 1982 marks the
end of the last serious ideological confrontations in the Portuguese labor market, with general
strikes and signiﬁcant labor turmoil. After the deep 1983 economic crisis, labor confrontations
subdued signiﬁcantly and the number of days lost to strikes were reduced permanently. In 1986
there were 232 thousand workers involved in strikes, the majority of them in the publicly-owned
transportation sector (52 percent), but this number fell to 29 thousand workers in 2007.
Using data from Quadros de Pessoal – a comprehensive employer-employee matched data
set of private sector employment – we ﬁnd a continuous increase in overall inequality from 1982
to 2006. This increase is stronger at the upper-tail of the distribution (90/50), especially until
1995. This can be explained by a slow increase in the supply of skills together with signiﬁcant
skill-biased shifts in demand. The skill-biased technological change explanation, common to
most developed and open economies, ﬁts with the rising college wage premium observed until
the mid 90s. Afterwards, there is a strong shift in the supply of skills, but no strong sign of a
deceleration in the demand for skills. These two developments led to a less sharper increase in
the college/noncollege wage gap. Nevertheless, a more in-depth analysis shows that the increase
in the wage gap was not common to all experience levels. Indeed, the wage gap decreased for
less experienced individuals after 1995.
The evolution of inequality at the lower-tail of the wage distribution is more dichotomous
across periods. There is a strong increase in 50/10 inequality in the ﬁrst period, but since
the late 90s the polarization of employment demand favored low-skill jobs, contributing to the
compression of the wage distribution. The minimum wage may have also played a (minor) role
in the reduction of 50/10 inequality, but only for female workers.
The results of the counterfactual analysis suggest that demand factors resulted in positive
price eﬀects in the initial period. The compositional change (larger supply of educated workers)
in the second period resulted in negative price eﬀects, countervailed by positive composition
eﬀects.
The importance of collective bargaining coverage to the evolution of wage inequality was
also tested. The counterfactual analysis, which takes advantage of a signiﬁcant drop in the
coverage (7 percentage points from 2000 to 2006), indicates that its impact on the evolution of
inequality during that period was negligible.
Previous studies of wage inequality in Portugal include Cardoso (1998), Machado and Mata
3(2001), Martins and Pereira (2004), and Machado and Mata (2005). These studies cover only
the ﬁrst half of our sample and concentrate on the estimation of the college wage premium.
Machado and Mata (2005) extends the analysis with counterfactual price and composition
eﬀects, using a quantile regression decomposition method. For the overlapping period, the wage
premium estimates reported in these studies are in line with the ones we obtain here with a
diﬀerent methodology.
Overall, demand and supply conditions do a great job explaining shifts in the Portuguese
wage distribution. The evolution of the demand for skills since 1995 is consistent with a trend of
polarization of work. However, the strong increase of relative supply of skills for the cohorts born
after the late 60s is associated with a reduction of the college wage premium. Institutions play
a minor role; the minimum wage helps in explaining the time series variation in the 50/10 wage
gap, but only for female, and collective bargaining instruments proved insuﬃcient to compress
the wage distribution.
2 Data
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) is an administrative dataset collected on an annual basis (reported
to October of each year) by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. Coverage is mandatory
for ﬁrms with at least one salaried worker, except for civil servants, entities that employ non-
permanent rural workers, and domestic workers. The QP is a source of information of great
importance in the microeconomic analysis of employment in Portugal and has been extensively
used (Cardoso 1998, Martins 2009).
The data is available from 1982 to 2006, with the exception of the years of 1990 and 2001.
For the purpose of this study, we collect the monthly wage, hours worked, age, education, and
occupation of workers. In 2006, the data cover nearly 3 million employees. This dataset has been
used to study diﬀerent aspects of the Portuguese labor market, among which wage inequality.
QP registers diﬀerent wage components. We use the base wage measure, which corresponds
to the monthly wage of regular working hours. Additionally, we consider a total wage measure
that includes, besides the base wage, subsidies and premiums paid on a monthly basis (e.g.
seniority and housing subsidies) and overtime pay. Finally, we also consider a measure of
hourly wages. Details about the sample construction are deferred to the Appendix.
43 The Portuguese wage structure in the last 25 years
Figure 1 displays the basic wage structure changes in the Portuguese economy, plotting the
log real wage change for male and female from 1982 to 2006. It illustrates the non-monotonic
widening of the wage distribution over the past two decades and a half. A large increase in
wage inequality, with the 90th percentile wages rising approximately by 50 log points relative
to the 10th percentile and by close to 40 log points relative to the 50th percentile. For males,
it remains ﬂat below the 50th percentile and increases dramatically above the median, whereas
for females it shows a small increase in the lower-tail of the distribution and a sizeable increase
above the 60th percentile.
[FIGURE 1 HERE (see page 29)]
The two panels in Figure 2 decompose this evolution in two periods, 1982-1995 and 1995-
2006. As it will be clear throughout the paper, despite the fact that no major shock occurred in
the Portuguese economy to justify them, the two periods are a natural way to split the sample
because of signiﬁcant shifts in the skill supply.
The trends in inequality are quite diﬀerent, both for males and females in the two periods.
For males, the ﬁrst period witnessed a strong increase in upper-tail inequality, and only a
modest one in lower-tail. For females, lower-tail inequality remained constant, whereas there
was a sizeable increase in upper-tail. In the second period, the increase in lower-tail inequality
for females is negligible, and for males there was actually a reduction in inequality; low wage
males clearly gained over median wages. In the upper-tail, the increase in inequality is stronger
for males than for females, but yet quite modest in comparison with the previous period.
[FIGURE 2 HERE (see page 29)]
An alternative way to present these trends is shown in Figure 3, which displays the evolu-
tion of the standard deviation of log-wages and log-wage residuals. The standard deviation of
log-wage residuals is obtained from OLS wage regressions estimated separately for each year.
The control variables included were ﬁve education dummies, eight age categories, and all pos-
sible interactions between these two variables (see the Appendix for more details). For males
the results show a continuous rise in inequality, although faster during the 1982-1995 period.
Between 1995 and 2001 the observed and residual standard deviations ﬂatten out, and resume
5increasing afterwards. For females the results are similar, except that in the second period the
increase is much smaller.
[FIGURE 3 HERE (see page 30)]
Age and education explain a smaller portion of the overall variance of log-wages for males
than for females. The increase in inequality over this period occurred within age and education
groups, as the residual inequality mimics pretty close the evolution of overall inequality, although
with a small decoupling at the end of the period (in the ﬁnal years, age and education explain
a little more of the inequality level).
Finally, we consider the evolution of within-group inequality. Table 1 takes a ﬁrst look at
the evolution of wage dispersion among age and education groups for private sector workers.
We use the 50/10 and 90/50 wage gaps and employment shares to identify price and quantity
trends. Three main conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, as in other countries, wage
dispersion fans out with age and education. This is true within all education and age groups.
Secondly, there is an impressive shift in the supply of skills. The share of low-skill individuals
(those with 6 or less years of schooling) decreased by 45 percentage points, while the share of
high-skilled workers rose from 2.5 percent in 1982 to 12.9 percent in 2006. The age composition
of the working population also changed during this period. The share of young workers decreased
from 53.6 percent in 1982 to 45.5 in 2006, and among them the share of high-skilled increased
increased from 2 percent to close to 18 percent. Finally, Table 1 highlights the changes in
inequality over time. The lower-tail inequality decreased among the low- and medium-skill, and
also for the high-skilled in the second period. The upper-tail inequality increased in all skill
levels, but more clearly for those aged above 36 years. The rise in inequality was much stronger
in the ﬁrst period, especially among the high-skilled, while in the second period there was a
decrease in lower-tail inequality, more pronounced for low- and medium-skill workers. This is
preliminary evidence of the role of the supply and demand shifts observed during these 25 years,
that may help in explaining the evolution of the Portuguese wage distribution. These shifts will
be explored in a more structured way in the next sections.
[TABLE 1 HERE (see page 25)]
Hitherto, the results reported used the base wage. However, institutions and market forces
may aﬀect distinctly the evolution of diﬀerent components of the total wage. To infer if our
6measure of inequality, but in particular its evolution, changes with the wage deﬁnition, in Figure
4, we extend our analysis to measures of total wages (base wages + other regular monthly
payments + overtime pay), hourly base wages, and hourly total wages.
[FIGURE 4 HERE (see page 30)]
From Figure 4, we take away three important facts:
1. Inequality is larger for measures of total wages than for measures of base wages. This
is expected for two reasons. First, total wages are less subject to regulations (institu-
tions). Second, given that not all individuals have the possibility, for instance, to work
longer/extra hours, the spread of the distribution increases;
2. For the same measure of wages, hourly measures result in slightly larger levels of inequality,
particularly at the upper-tail;
3. Despite these diﬀerences, the time proﬁle of upper- and lower-tail inequality is rather
similar across all wage measures; sharper increases in the early years and slowdown (even
decrease) after the mid 90s. For instance, lower-tail inequality increased 4 log points from
1982 to 1995 if measured in base wages and 3 log points if measured in total wages. Over
the same period, upper-tail inequality increased 24 log points if measured in base wages
and 21 log points if measured in total wages.
Therefore, in the remaining analysis, which focus on explaining the evolution of inequality
rather than its level, we choose the base wages measure. Arguably, this measure ought to be
more inﬂuenced by the institutional setting and, in this sense, it constitutes an harder testing
ground for the hypothesis that the increase in inequality in Portugal is market-driven as in other
economies (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008, Dustmann et al. 2009). Furthermore, for statistical
reasons, the choice of base wages avoids potential measurement errors in measures based on
hours worked.
4 The sources of rising (and falling) inequality
The wage distribution in Portugal widened at the top, more strongly until the mid-90s. The
returns to education are quite high in the Portuguese economy. However, there has been a
huge increase in the supply of skills, namely of college graduates. In the US, Autor, Katz and
7Kearney (2008) show that the increase in the return to education is an important component
of the rise in inequality.
The supply of skills in the Portuguese economy is characterized by a large shift in the rate
of college graduates during the second half of the 90s. This large supply shift was matched, in
part, with a shift in the demand for skills. However, this created a signiﬁcant cohort eﬀect that
may have generated a reduction in the wage premium for education since the second half of the
90s. We analyze this issue by computing the college/noncollege gap by experience group.
Another important issue is the role of the minimum wage to inequality. The debate for
the US is large, and the evidence mixed (Lemieux 2006, Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008). We
follow this line of research and try to evaluate the role of the minimum wage in explaining wage
inequality in Portugal.
4.1 Sources of the rising college/noncollege wage premium
We follow Katz and Murphy (1992) and use a formal supply-demand framework that helps us
understand the evolution of the returns to education during the last two decades and a half.
The framework uses a two-level CES production function framework to explain the educational
wage diﬀerentials by ﬂuctuations in labor supply and smooth trends in relative demand growth.
In this setup aggregate production depends only on the quantities of skilled and unskilled
workers. We take skilled workers as those with a college degree and unskilled workers as those
without a college degree. The CES function stipulates an aggregate elasticity of substitution
between the two types of labor, given by σ. Aggregate output can by written as:
Qt = [αt (atNct)




where Nct and Nnt are the quantities employed of college equivalents and noncollege equivalents,
at and bt are the college and noncollege labor augmenting technological change, αt is a technology
parameter and ρ is the production parameter. Skill-biased technological changes imply an
increase in at
bt or αt. The aggregate elasticity of substitution can be computed as σ = 1/(1−ρ).
Under the assumption that college and noncollege equivalents are paid their marginal prod-

















8where Dt indexes relative demand shifts favoring college graduates equivalents. The greater is
σ the smaller the impact of shifts in relative supplies on relative wages and the greater must be
the ﬂuctuations in demand shifts to explain the time series variation of relative wages for given
time series variation of relative quantities.
Table 2 presents the estimates of a version of equation (2). To capture the demand shifts,
we use a simple time trend, t, and a measure of the labor market conditions, the unemploy-
ment rate, URt. The model also includes the log real minimum wage, Wmin
t , and the average












t + α4URt + α5UIt + t. (3)
An important component of the rise in inequality in the US is the increase in the return to
education. In European countries the pattern is somewhat diﬀerent, either because the demand
pressure on high-skill wages was not as strong as in the US or due to a stronger supply shift in
college educated workers. The large dichotomy of supply shifts in the pre- and post-95 periods
makes Portugal an interesting case. We focus on the wage diﬀerential between college and
noncollege graduates.
[TABLE 2 HERE (see page 26)]
The top panel of Figure 5 presents college relative supply and wage premium series over
1984 to 2006 deviated from a linear trend. This ﬁgure reveals an acceleration in relative supply
of college graduates since 1995. The opposite occurred during the 80s and early 90s. These
ﬂuctuations in the relative supply of college graduates, paired with a constant trend growth in
relative college demand, do a great deal in explaining the evolution of the wage gap. Figure 5
shows that the wage gap increased over the 80s and early 90s (when relative supply was below
trend levels) and decreased thereafter, again in an opposite move with relative supply.
[FIGURE 5 HERE (see page 31)]
The lower panel of Figure 5 uses the results in column (1) in Table 2 to predict the evolution
of the college wage premium and compares it with the actual college wage diﬀerential. The
model does an excellent job in predicting the growth of the wage diﬀerential since 1995, but it
underestimates the college wage gap during the ﬁrst half of the 90s. This ﬁts with the evidence
9of a signiﬁcant supply shift to explain the post-95 outcome. The slowdown in labor supply
in the second half of the 80s lead the model to overpredict the wage gap and the subsequent
stabilization during the ﬁrst half of the 90s implies an underestimation of the gap. For the ﬁrst
period, demand shifts were more important, and those are captured in the model through the
trend (smooth) variable. These demand shifts generated in the ﬁrst period a large price-eﬀect.
The implied elasticity of substitution from columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 is around 1.7,
slightly higher than the 1.6 estimates for the US in Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), but only
about one-third the estimates – of 5 – for Germany in Dustmann et al. (2009). There is evidence
of a substantive responsiveness of wages to supply and demand shocks in Portugal. This result
complements the micro economic evidence of strong wage cyclicality in the Portuguese economy
obtained, among others, in Carneiro, Guimar˜ aes and Portugal (2009).
Table 2 considers also the possibility of a slowdown in demand shifts since 1995. In columns
(2) and (5), we interact the time trend with a post-1995 dummy, which proves to be non-
signiﬁcant. The same conclusion holds for the impact of changes in labor market conditions,
the minimum wage, and UI costs which seem to have at most a small eﬀect on the wage gap.
4.2 The college/noncollege gap by experience group
As shown in Table 1, the evolution of wage inequality diﬀered signiﬁcantly across and within
age/skill groups. The increase in inequality was concentrated in older workers, especially among
the more educated. We take a closer look at this pattern in Figure 6 comparing the evolution
of the college premium and college relative supply for younger and older workers. The college
wage gap increased in a similar way for both groups until the ﬁrst half of the 90s, but since 1995
the college premium jumped almost 30 log points for the more experienced and fell by almost
20 log points for young college graduates. If workers with the same education but diﬀerent
levels of experience are imperfect substitutes in production, we may expect these developments
to be related with diﬀerences in the relative skill supplies in each experience-group (Card and
Lemieux 2001). Consistent with this view, Figure 6 also shows a much more rapid increase in
the supply of college graduates among the less experienced workers since 1995 (100 log points,
which compares with 40 log points for the older group). The shifts in the relative supply of skills
presented in Table 1 and Figure 6 show important diﬀerences among diﬀerent age (and potential
experience) cohorts. The intercohort shifts in the relative supply of higher educated workers
is the result of the extraordinary increase in the rate of growth of educational attainment that
10characterizes the cohorts born after the late 60s.
[FIGURE 6 HERE (see page 32)]
We use the Katz and Murphy framework to take into account these diﬀerent trends, and
estimate a model for the college wage gap by experience group that includes the own experience
group relative skill supplies. The basic models of education-related wage diﬀerentials ignore
diﬀerences in the experience distribution of educational attainment. However, the introduction
of imperfect substitutability between younger (less experienced) and older (more experienced)
workers yields the prediction that an increase in the intercohort trend in educational attainment
will lead to a relative fall in the college wage premium for younger workers that will make its
way through the experience distribution as the cohort ages.
The Card and Lemieux (2001) model relaxes the hypothesis that diﬀerent experience groups
with the same education are perfect substitutes in production. It uses a production function
similar to equation (1), but assumes that aggregate output depends on two CES subaggregates
of college and noncollege labor, in which the elasticity of substitution is a function of the partial
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent experience groups with the same level of education
(σE).
In the model, shifts in the experience-group-speciﬁc relative supply are expected to shift the
























+ β3Xt + γj + jt, (4)
where j indexes the experience groups, the γj are the experience group ﬁxed eﬀects and Xt
include the same covariates as in Table 2. Under the assumptions of Card and Lemieux (2001),
we can interpret −1/β2 as an estimate of σ, and −1/β1 as an estimate of σE.
The results are presented in Table 3. The ﬁrst two columns present pooled estimates for the
four experience groups allowing for group speciﬁc intercepts. These estimates point to signiﬁcant
eﬀects of both own-group and aggregate supplies on the college wage gap by experience group.
The aggregate elasticity in column (1) is close to 2, similar to the one obtained in Table 2. The
implied partial elasticity of substitution between experience groups within the same education
group is closer to 3. This is a smaller elasticity than reported in Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008)
for the US (3.6) and the estimates by Card and Lemieux (2001) for the US, U.K., and Canada.
11The Portuguese labor market shows a great deal of wages sensitivity to supply conditions, even
if somewhat lower than the more ﬂexible Anglo-Saxon labor markets.
[TABLE 3 HERE (see page 26)]
These estimates allow us to conclude that the diﬀerences in own-group relative college supply
growth can explain about half of the evolution of the college wage premium in the last couple
of decades, and virtually all the evolution since 1995. In the latter period, the college wage
premium decreased 15 log points for the less experienced and increased 14 log points for the
group with 20-29 years of experience (see left panel of Figure 6). Over the same period the
diﬀerence in own-group relative supply between the two groups was 79 log points (with a faster
increase for the less experienced (see right panel of Figure 6). Thus, using the implied own-
group inverse elasticity of column (1), we ﬁnd that the quicker increase in college supply for the
younger group explains 27 log points of the diﬀerence in wage gap, this is, 93 percent of the 29
log points diﬀerence in wage premium changes.
These results point to the potential importance of diﬀerent sensitivities of the wage gap to
own-group and aggregate supplies across experience groups. This is reported in the remaining
columns of Table 3. The demand shifts are more important for prime-age individuals, those
with experience between 10 and 29 years. The sensitivity of the wage gap to own-group supply
decreases with experience; it is higher for younger individuals (3.9 for those with less than 10
years of experience and 1.8 for those with experience between 10 and 19 years). On the contrary,
the sensitivity to aggregate supply increases with the experience level. The less sensitive are
the youngest individuals; the elasticity is very low (less than 2) for the less experienced workers,
and non-signiﬁcant for those with 10-19 years of experience. Interestingly enough, the older
workers’ wage gap is not sensitive to changes in supply (either own-group or aggregate). The
minimum wage and the unemployment rate do not play an important role in explaining the
wage gap of any of the experience groups. Nonetheless, the coeﬃcient of the minimum wage is
larger for young and less experienced workers, an expected result given the larger incidence of
the minimum wage among young workers.
The shifts in cohort-speciﬁc supply of highly educated workers, matched with a steady
increase in relative demand for skills, provide a good explanation for the observed changes in
education-related wage gaps. Indeed, the simple supply-demand framework used in this section
can account for a great deal of the evolution of between-group inequality. The rise in the wage
12premium during the 80s and ﬁrst half of the 90s and the slowdown observed since that date are
associated with the diﬀerential rise in relative supply by experience groups. In particular, the
reversal trend in the wage gap of less experienced college graduate workers is associated with
both a signiﬁcant increase in own-group supply and a higher sensitivity of this group’s wage
gap to the aggregate supply of skills.
4.3 The role of the minimum wage
The minimum wage is usually considered an important feature of the wage-setting institutions
in the Portuguese economy (Cardoso 1998). However, the impact of the minimum wage on wage
inequality in Portugal remains pretty much unexplored. It aﬀects directly a sizeable portion
of salaried workers, but its impact is not fully described by the simple share of workers that
earn its euro amount. Indeed, the change in the minimum wage may generate a “wave” eﬀect
on wage growth that goes well beyond the lower-tail of the wage distribution. This eﬀect can
be explained by a negative spillover of the minimum wage, as in Autor, Manning and Smith
(2008).
The “wave” eﬀect is displayed in Figure 7. Notice how the wage growth falls below the
minimum wage increase (4.4 percent) in wage percentiles just above the minimum wage and
starts recovering only above the 40th percentile for the total of salaried workers. This eﬀect is
sharper for the textile sector (which has a larger share of minimum wage earners), where the
growth rate of wages falls until the 70th percentile.
[FIGURE 7 HERE (see page 32)]
The minimum wage should primarily aﬀect inequality in the lower-tail of the wage distri-
bution and among female workers, those with a higher incidence of minimum wage jobs. The
exercise in Table 2, based on the college wage gap, was not designed to capture the impact
of the minimum wage and its heterogeneity. To analyze the potentially diﬀerentiated impact
in the upper- and lower-tail, we use again the Katz and Murphy framework and run simple
OLS regressions of the 90/50 and 50/10 wage diﬀerentials on the log real minimum wage, a
time trend and the other variables included in Table 2. The results are displayed in Table 4.
They show a negative signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the minimum wage, equal to -0.431, for female
lower-tail inequality, and a smaller non-signiﬁcant impact for males, -0.338. As expected, the
coeﬃcient is non-signiﬁcant for both males and females in the 90/50 wage ratio regressions.
13[TABLE 4 HERE (see page 27)]
We cannot commit, however, to a causal interpretation of these coeﬃcients. This issue
deserves further analysis, namely in line with the results of Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008),
but they are, nevertheless, indicative that there is some scope for a limited impact of the
minimum wage in lower-tail inequality.
5 Inequality: the role of composition and prices
The evidence presented hitherto as made clear the signiﬁcant changes in the composition of the
Portuguese labor force, particularly in terms of its qualiﬁcations. Thus, it is possible that a
fraction of the rise in inequality is attributable to composition eﬀects; a larger share of more
educated individuals, holding prices (wages) constant, would typically lead to higher inequality.
One must not, however, play down price eﬀects that come about through the standard impact
of supply, demand, and institutional factors in relative prices.
Albeit in a partial equilibrium framework, we explore these eﬀects by using the kernel
re-weighting method developed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), widely used in this
literature.1 The observed wage density at time t, f(w|t), can be decomposed into the product
of the density of observable wages conditional on observable attributes x at time t, g(w|x,T = t),
and the density of the same attributes, h(x|T = t). Formally,
f(w|T = t) =
Z
g(w|x,T = t)h(x|T = t)dx (5)
and similarly for time T = t0.
In order to compute the counterfactual wage distribution in year t that would have prevailed
if the workforce attributes were the same as in year t0, one needs to re-weight the “price”
function, g(w|x,T = t), by the ratio of the “composition” functions, h(x|T = t0)/h(x|T = t).
As shown by DiNardo et al. (1996), this ratio can be easily calculated by noting that h(x|T =
t0)/h(x|T = t) = Pr(T = t0|x)/Pr(T = t|x) × (1 − Pr(T = t0))/Pr(T = t0). Notice that the
reweighting function can be computed by using a dichotomous variable model – logit or probit
– in the pooled data for years t and t0. In our case, the set of conditioning variables includes
1Machado and Mata (2005) apply a counterfactual decomposition of price and quantities to changes in the
wage distribution of the Portuguese economy. Their results for the 1986–1995 period are quite similar to the ones
reported here.
14dummy variables for ﬁve levels of schooling and eight age groups, and all possible interaction
terms between education and age dummies.
The same principle can be applied to decompose residual inequality; the price function
g(w|x,T = t) is replaced with the residual price function g(|x,T = t). The residuals, , are
obtained from a regression of log wages on the same set of attributes listed above.
A caveat emptor common in this literature is the partial equilibrium nature of the decom-
position proposed, as it assumes that prices and quantities (characteristics) are independent.
In the current setting, with large changes in the composition of qualiﬁcations and experience
(age), this assumption of independence is likely to be violated. Nevertheless, we carry out the
exercise as it is worth for comparison with other results in the literature, but the results should
be interpreted carefully.
Price and composition eﬀects: Estimates
Figure 8 plots observed and counterfactual overall inequality. Table 5 complements this infor-
mation with the rates of change (in log points) for particular years. The three counterfactual
curves plotted hold prices constant at their 1982, 1995, and 2006 levels, while labor force com-
position is allowed to evolve as observed over the full sample, 1982 to 2006. Thus, in these
ﬁgures, a vertical diﬀerence between the curves identiﬁes the price eﬀect at each year, i.e., the
composition is held constant at that year’s level while the prices change across counterfactual
curves. Movements along each counterfactual curve identify composition eﬀects.
[FIGURE 8 HERE (see page 33)]
[TABLE 5 HERE (see page 27)]
There are two distinct periods of inequality growth. Inequality grew at a faster pace from
1982 to 1995 than in the subsequent period, 1995-2006. In the upper-tail (90/50), overall male
wage inequality grew by 24 log points in the ﬁrst sub-period, and after 1995 grew 15.3 log points.
But while the change of prices from 1982 to 1995 explain a substantial part of the observed
increase in inequality, the same is not true afterwards. Indeed, the price changes from 1995 to
2006 yielded negative or tiny positive price eﬀects. A tentative explanation for this change of
pattern between periods rests on the substantive compositional changes that occurred. Thus,
one might speculate that demand factors explain the positive and substantial price eﬀect of the
early period, while supply shifts counterbalanced the increase in demand to yield rather paltry
15price eﬀects in the more recent period. All these eﬀects are evident in Figure 8, where it is clear
that the counterfactual curves for 1995 and 2006 are closer, resulting in smaller price eﬀects
(vertical distances), and the composition eﬀects are also slightly bigger at the end of the period
(moving along each counterfactual curve).
In the lower-tail (50/10), the ﬁrst period is characterized by an increase in overall inequality
of 8.5 log points, while between 1995 and 2006 this increase is almost wiped out, −6.5 log
points. The changes in prices from 1982 to 1995 explain again a substantial part of the increase in
inequality. In the second period, the price changes would have resulted in even larger reductions
in lower-tail male inequality. The composition eﬀect must have cancelled out part of the price
eﬀect. Although not as pronounced as in the upper-tail, composition eﬀects play a larger role
in the later part of sample, which is consistent with the evidence gather for the educational and
age changes that characterized the Portuguese economy.
In Machado and Mata (2005), the contributions of increasing returns to education and of
workforce composition have a similar contribution to the increase in wage inequality over the
1986–1995 period. In our case, we split the analysis by gender and obtain a larger price eﬀect
for men in upper- and lower-tail inequality, but a larger composition eﬀect for women, over the
same period. Thus, the results seem to be consistent in both methodologies.
[FIGURE 9 HERE (see page 34)]
The broad messages drawn for overall inequality carry over to residual inequality. Residual
inequality slowed down in the ﬁnal period, 1995-2006, at both ends of the distribution (see
Figure 9 and Table 5). Price eﬀects are more important in the early period, where they account
for at least 62.5 percent of the raise in inequality. In the ﬁnal period, composition eﬀects play a
larger role, and for lower-tail inequality a countervailing composition eﬀect ends up cancelling
the reduction in inequality implied by the price eﬀect.
Keeping in mind the caveats raised, the results suggest that demand factors resulted in
positive price eﬀects in the initial period. The compositional change (larger supply of educated
workers) in the second period resulted in negative price eﬀects, countervailed by positive compo-
sition eﬀects. Furthermore, these results are in line with the evidence obtained in the previous
section.
166 Facts and explanations of polarization
The evolution of wage inequality in Portugal shows a strong increase in upper- and lower-tail
inequalities until the mid-nineties. However, after that period the wage distribution polarizes,
with a continuous increase in the upper half and a clear reversal in the lower half of the distribu-
tion. This polarization is observed in overall inequality, residual inequality and in educational
wage gaps, a result also obtained for the US, Germany, and the UK.
What can account for this diﬀerentiated evolution at both ends of the wage distribution?
We follow Goos and Manning (2007) and look for shifts in the employment structure consistent
with the “polarization of work”, in which the increased demand for skills of the higher-educated
workers is matched with a reduced demand for middle-educated workers, while the demand in
occupations with low levels of education was left untouched.
These shifts in the demand for skills characterize the process of international division of
labor, in which global outsourcing plays a relevant role. The Portuguese economy is particularly
sensitive to this process, as it undertook a signiﬁcant increase in the level of skills of younger
cohorts. This makes the Portuguese experience interesting to study the “polarization of work”,
as both demand and supply evolved in parallel directions since 1995.
The polarization of work is a demand side phenomenon, with rising relative demand for high-
and low-skill occupations. Its implications are testable: if the changes in the wage distribution
observed before and after 1995 are explained by demand shifts, then the employment changes by
skill level and the corresponding wage changes should be positively associated in both periods.
We apply a methodology similar to the one in Goos and Manning (2007) to our data, using
both wages and educational levels to proxy for the occupational skill level.
Figure 10 presents the change in the shares in total employment from 1982 to 1994 and from
1996 to 2006 by occupation skill percentile, using both average wages and education level as
proxies for the skill intensity.2 It shows strikingly diﬀerent patterns in the change in employment
composition between periods. In the ﬁrst period, there was a signiﬁcant reduction in the share
of employment in occupations with lower skill level and an increase for occupations with higher
skill level. This is in sharp contrast with the post-1995 period, in which employment growth
seems to have polarized. There is a strong employment growth in occupations with higher skill
levels, a reduction in middle-skill jobs and rising employment in low-skill jobs.
2In 1995, the occupational codes changed and the mapping of pre- and post-95 classiﬁcations is not perfect.
For this reason, we use them separately, and exclude 1995 due to transition problems evident in the data.
17[FIGURE 10 HERE (see page 35)]
This evolution of employment growth was matched with similar changes in the wage distri-
bution, as shown in Figure 11. The real wage growth was monotone during the ﬁrst period,
although sharpest above the median, being negative below the 20th percentile. In the post-1995
period, wage growth follows a U-shaped pattern. It was stronger below the 30th percentile and
above the 60th percentile. This means that labor market prices and quantities appear to covary
positively in each of these two periods.
[FIGURE 11 HERE (see page 35)]
Overall, we take these observations as evidence that labor market demand shifts have favored
low- and high-skill jobs relative to middle-skill jobs over the last 12 years, a pattern that is at
odds with what we observe during the 80s and ﬁrst half of the 90s in which shifts in demand
seem to have been rising in skill.
7 What does collective bargaining do to wage inequality?
The role of unions in shaping wage and employment inequality has been extensively analyzed
since the inﬂuential work of Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984). Unions are believed to play a crucial
role in reducing economic inequality. The impact of de-unionization on wage inequality was
analyzed more recently in DiNardo et al. (1996) and Card and DiNardo (2002) for the US and
in Dustmann et al. (2009) for Germany. These studies conclude that the decrease in union
coverage is in general associated with an increase in wage inequality, particularly at the bottom
of the wage distribution.
The Portuguese labor law grants unions the right to negotiate over a wide range of aspects of
labor relations, including wages. Collective bargaining negotiations may occur at the industry or
occupation level, and at the regional or national level. In addition, the Ministry of Employment
can extend the coverage of an existing agreement to ﬁrms and workers of the same industry
that did not participate in the bargaining process. These agreements deﬁne a set of wages for
quite detailed occupation levels. There is evidence, however, that ﬁrms pay above these wages
(Cardoso and Portugal 2005), giving them scope to diﬀerentiate among workers. The Portuguese
wage setting system has some traits of a centralized one; however, it is characterized by an
18atomistic structure, from both the union and employer structures, with multiple agreements
reached between ﬁrms and workers representatives.
QP data do not have information on the unionization of Portuguese workers, but there
is information on the type of collective bargaining coverage for each worker (Table 6). The
speciﬁc collective bargaining agreements foreseen in the law are: (i) collective agreement (Acordo
Colectivo de Trabalho, ACT); (ii) collective contract (Contrato Colectivo de Trabalho, CCT);
(iii) ﬁrm-level agreement (Acordo de Empresa, AE); and, (iv) regulatory edict (Portaria de
Regulamenta¸ c˜ ao de Trabalho, PRT). In the period from 1982 to 2006, there are two distinct
trends in collective bargaining coverage. Until 2000, the share of workers covered by some form
of agreement was close to 97 percent. Between 2000 and 2006, it declined quite rapidly, by more
than 7 percentage points.
It is natural to ask whether this fall in coverage had an impact on wage inequality. As
we have seen, the early 2000s were characterized by falling wage inequality at the bottom and
slight increase in inequality at the top of the wage distribution. We can use the DiNardo
et al. (1996) framework and the information on collective bargaining coverage to construct
a counterfactual that decomposes total variation in wage inequality into a price eﬀect and a
collective bargaining composition eﬀect. As before, the decomposition assumes that the union
wage-eﬀect is independent of union coverage, and more generally that there are no spillovers
from the unionized to the non-unionized ﬁrms and workers.
[TABLE 6 HERE (see page 28)]
In Table 7, we held constant the level of collective agreement coverage at its 2000 or 2006
values, and compute the change in inequality between 2000 and 2006 attributable to price
eﬀects. Formally, holding constant the collective bargaining at its 2000 level, the counterfactual
wage distribution in 2006 is given as in DiNardo et al. (1996) by:
f(w;tw = 2006,tu|x = 2000,tx = 2006) (6)
=
Z Z
f(w|u,x,tw = 2006)ψu|x(u,x)dF(U|x,tu|x = 2006)dF(x|tx = 2006),
where u is the collective agreement indicator variable and x the other attributes considered
19above (age, education, and their interactions). The re-weighting function ψ is given by:
u
Pr(u = 1|x,tu|x = 2000)
Pr(u = 1|x,tu|x = 2006)
+ (1 − u)
Pr(u = 0|x,tu|x = 2000)
Pr(u = 1|x,tu|x = 2006)
. (7)
The results presented in Table 7 have the expected sign, but a rather small magnitude.
The increase in male upper-tail inequality that would have happened if the level of collective
bargaining had remained at its 2000 level is 6.8 log points, which compares with the observed
overall inequality increase of 7.5 log points; the values for females are, in the same order, 7.7
and 6.2 log points, a slightly higher diﬀerence. Interestingly, the reduction of the importance of
collective bargaining has had almost no impact in lower-tail wage inequality; a decomposition
of collective bargaining by education and age level shows that the majority of the reduction in
coverage occurred among highly educated and young workers.
[TABLE 7 HERE (see page 28)]
The results for residual inequality are remarkably similar to those reported for overall in-
equality. Once we account for the productive characteristics, 95 percent of the increase in
upper-tail male inequality is due to price eﬀects, while in the case of overall inequality the value
was 91 percent; in the case of females, 75 percent of the increase in upper-tail residual inequality
arises from price eﬀects, less than the 80 percent in overall inequality. The proportion of the
price eﬀects is even more similar between overall and residual lower-tail inequality.
In line with our results, Dustmann et al. (2009) report that 2004’s German inequality would
have decrease more if the unionization levels had remained at the higher levels of 1995. A
similar result is found in DiNardo et al. (1996) for the US for the 1973 to 1988 period.
8 Conclusion
This paper challenges the view that the institutional settings common in Europe and shared by
the Portuguese labor market prevented rises in wage inequality. In fact, we are able to explain
most of the developments in overall and residual inequality in Portugal using the simple Katz
and Murphy (1992) supply and demand framework.
The Portuguese labor market is an extraordinary setting to test the predictions from such
a simple model. In the last two decades and a half, we can easily identify relative supply and
demand shifts and interpret their impact on relative wages, while changes in the institutional
20setting have been quite modest. The relative supply of skills has a dichotomous evolution. First,
from 1982 to 1995, the share of college graduates remained at very low levels. Later on, there is
an impressive increase in the supply of skills, with the share of college graduates increasing by
almost 8 percentage points. The demand shifts in the Portuguese economy are characteristics
of a period of increasing economic integration, initially within the European Union and later
globally.
These market forces resulted in increased wage inequality, both at the top and bottom of the
wage distribution. The upper-tail inequality increase was much stronger during the ﬁrst half
of the period (until mid-90s) than afterwards. We interpret this slowdown, not as a reduction
in demand pressure, but as the result of an extraordinary increase in the supply of skills. Two
results are particularly important to draw this conclusion. First, in the post-95 period, we
observe a polarization of work – a demand phenomenon, characterized by relative employment
and wage gains for low- and high-skill workers. Second, more skilled and younger cohorts
experience a reduction of the college wage gap since the increase in high-skills was concentrated
in this younger group. Older cohorts witnessed large increases in wage inequality.
The lower-tail inequality increased in the pre-95 period (especially in the 1987-1995 period)
and declined (or at best remained stable) subsequently. The behavior of lower-tail wage changes
is mainly explained by negative demand shocks during the ﬁrst period and by the polarization
of work, which beneﬁted low-wage jobs (against middle-skilled jobs) and helped in reducing
inequality after 1995. The wage setting institutions in the Portuguese economy play only a
minor role in promoting wage compression. The minimum wage is shown to have a relevant
impact in reducing lower-tail inequality for female workers.
The reduction in collective bargaining observed since 2000 accounts only for a negligible
fraction of the increase in upper-tail inequality and did not inﬂuence at all the lower-tail devel-
opments described above.
We see these results as evidence that market forces are the main explanations for the changes
in the wage distribution in Portugal. This is in accordance with the available evidence for other
advanced countries, such as Germany, UK, and US.
21Appendix
Sample selection
The selection criteria applied to our samples consisted in keeping all wage spells correspond-
ing to full-time workers earning at least the minimum wage.
In 1983, the workers’ age is available only for a third of the sample. Indeed, it seems to
be missing ‘not at random’, impacting on 1983’s wage equation estimates. To avoid losing one
additional year of data, 1982, in the case of Figures 3, 8, and 9, we report interpolated values
for 1983.
Education and Age
The education variable distinguishes ﬁve groups. This number of categories aimed at cap-
turing the changes in mandatory schooling that were in faced by workers in our sample. The ﬁve
categories are: less than 4 years of schooling, more than 4 through 6 years of schooling, 9 years
of schooling, 12 years of schooling, and college degree. Whenever necessary these categories are
aggregated in broader groups.
The age variable considers eight age groups: less than 25 years old; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39;
40-44; 45-49; 50-54; and more than 54 years old.
Relative supply measures
We calculate the quantities supplied of college and noncollege graduates using the QP sam-
ples. We construct a labor quantity sample measured in eﬃciency units for all workers with
0 to 39 years of potential experience. These workers are split into 400 gender × education ×
potential experience cells. Experience groups are single-year categories of 0 to 39 years; educa-
tion groups are the same as above. The quantity data are merged with price data containing
mean real wage by year, gender, potential experience, and education. To compute the eﬃciency
units, we use mean real wage by year, gender, education, and age.
Education wage diﬀerentials
The data are sorted into gender-education-potential experience groups, based on a break-
down of the data into two gender, ﬁve education, and four potential experience categories (0-9,
10-19, 20-29, and 30 or more years). Log monthly base wages of full-time workers are regressed
in each year separately by gender on the dummy variables for four education categories, a quar-
tic in experience and interactions of the experience quartic with the education dummies. The
22composition adjusted mean log wage for each of the forty groups in a given year is the predicted
log wage from these regressions evaluated ate the relevant experience level (5, 15, 25 and 35
years for each of the four experience groups). Mean log wages for broader groups in each year
represent weighted averages of the relevant cell means using a ﬁxed set of weights, equal to the
mean share of total employment by each group over 1982 through 2006.
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24Table 1: Within-group wage dispersion by age and education
Within-group Worker share
wage dispersion
1982 1995 2006 1982 1995 2006
Low skill
Age < 36 50/10 0.260 0.217 0.185 0.334 0.158 0.037
90/50 0.389 0.422 0.459
Age 36-45 50/10 0.403 0.341 0.247 0.160 0.132 0.068
90/50 0.453 0.616 0.508
Age > 45 50/10 0.378 0.434 0.321 0.193 0.153 0.130
90/50 0.488 0.666 0.717
All 50/10 0.332 0.358 0.265 0.688 0.442 0.235
90/50 0.448 0.639 0.664
Medium skill
Age < 36 50/10 0.466 0.391 0.305 0.190 0.340 0.338
90/50 0.547 0.771 0.686
Age 36-45 50/10 0.562 0.785 0.429 0.058 0.101 0.183
90/50 0.538 0.780 1.083
Age > 45 50/10 0.618 1.003 0.643 0.040 0.065 0.115
90/50 0.749 0.784 1.255
All 50/10 0.550 0.528 0.400 0.287 0.506 0.636
90/50 0.723 1.100 1.046
High skill
Age < 36 50/10 0.639 0.983 0.756 0.012 0.028 0.080
90/50 0.639 0.920 0.927
Age 36-45 50/10 0.764 1.220 1.213 0.007 0.014 0.031
90/50 0.610 0.877 1.174
Age > 45 50/10 2.159 2.308 2.797 0.005 0.010 0.018
90/50 0.633 1.000 1.233
All 50/10 0.850 1.194 1.000 0.025 0.051 0.129
90/50 0.784 1.082 1.380
Notes: See note to Figure 1 in p.29. Low skill - 6 or less years of
schooling; Medium skill - 9 to 12 years of schooling; High skill -
college degree.
25Table 2: Regression models for the college/noncollege log wage gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
College/Noncollege relative supply -0.724 -0.678 -0.769 -0.605 -0.587 -0.616
0.154 0.165 0.162 0.193 0.200 0.198
Log real minimum wage -0.433 -0.719 -0.691 -0.626 -0.704
0.461 0.488 0.502 0.521 0.646
Unemployment rate -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.031
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Log unemp. insurance per unemp’ed 0.042 0.021
0.068 0.085
Time 0.032 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.037 0.034 0.021
0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
Time*1995 -0.002 -0.001
0.002 0.002
Constant -0.269 -0.229 1.272 2.611 2.508 1.992 3.274
0.191 0.199 1.65 1.847 1.897 2.143 2.611
No. of observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
R
2 0.919 0.923 0.924 0.933 0.934 0.934 0.892
Notes: Standard errors in italic. Each column presents an OLS regression of the ﬁxed-weighted
college wage premium on the indicated variables. The minimum wage is deﬂated by the consumers
price index. The sources for labor supply and wages are the Quadros de Pessoal, 1984-2006.
Table 3: Regression models for the college/noncollege log wage gap by experience group
Potential experience groups
All groups 0-9 years 10-19 years 20-29 years 30-39 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Own minus aggregate supply -0.338 -0.331 -0.260 -0.234 -0.569 -0.612 0.037 0.017 0.325 0.284
0.044 0.040 0.124 0.134 0.083 0.098 0.095 0.099 0.230 0.258
Aggregate supply -0.485 -0.373 -0.581 -0.469 -0.150 -0.159 -0.473 -0.362 -0.208 -0.163
0.108 0.137 0.315 0.354 0.142 0.147 0.208 0.234 0.135 0.181
Log real minimum wage -0.302 -0.271 -0.081 -0.174 -0.151
0.339 0.507 0.273 0.462 0.387
Unemployment rate -0.010 -0.014 0.005 -0.012 -0.003
0.006 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.007
Time 0.038 0.038 0.030 0.029 0.038 0.040 0.036 0.035 0.026 0.027
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.004
Constant -0.156 1.157 -0.149 1.083 -0.064 0.149 0.190 1.009 1.085 1.639
0.132 1.285 0.345 1.811 0.113 1.031 0.368 1.696 0.342 1.397
No. of observations 84 84 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
R
2 0.941 0.943 0.865 0.934 0.983 0.984 0.974 0.977 0.981 0.981
Notes: Standard errors in italic. Each column presents an OLS regression of the ﬁxed-weighted college wage
premium on the indicated variables. The college/noncollege wage premium is calculated at the mid-point of each
potential experience group. The minimum wage is deﬂated by the consumer price index. Columns (1) and (2) also
include dummy variables for the four potential experience groups used in the Table. The sources for labor supply
and wages is the Quadros de Pessoal, 1984-2006.
26Table 4: Regression models for the 90/50 ad 50/10 wage ratios
Male Female
90/50 50/10 90/50 50/10
College/Noncollege relative supply -0.056 -0.452 -0.453 -0.055
0.068 0.099 0.116 0.043
Log real minimum wage -0.064 -0.338 -0.251 -0.431
0.171 0.25 0.276 0.111
Unemployment rate -0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.003
0.003 0.004 0.006 0.001
Time 0.017 0.017 0.027 0.008
0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001
Constant 0.706 1.044 0.881 1.681
0.645 0.948 1.109 0.418
No. of observations 21 21 21 21
R
2 0.989 0.827 0.968 0.932
Notes: See notes of Table 2.
Table 5: Observed and composition-constant changes in overall and residual inequality, log
points ×100
Overall Inequality Residual Inequality
1982-1995 1995-2006 1982-2006 1982-1995 1995-2006 1982-2006
∆90/50
Males
Observed 24.0 15.3 39.2 10.8 9.9 20.7
1982’s composition 15.5 -3.4 12.1 9.0 3.4 12.4
1995’s composition 13.9 -3.0 10.9 8.5 4.0 12.5
2006’s composition 20.0 3.0 23.0 10.0 5.5 15.5
Females
Observed 25.7 9.3 35.0 10.3 4.2 14.5
1982’s composition 5.0 -16.1 -11.1 4.1 -5.0 -0.9
1995’s composition 21.5 -21.6 -0.1 6.7 -6.9 -0.2
2006’s composition 34.7 0.4 35.0 12.5 -4.8 7.8
∆50/10
Males
Observed 8.5 -6.5 2.0 7.2 -0.3 6.9
1982’s composition 3.4 -8.2 -4.8 4.5 -6.7 -2.2
1995’s composition 6.9 -10.5 -3.6 5.4 -6.7 -1.3
2006’s composition 8.2 -14.2 -6.0 8.0 -6.8 1.1
Females
Observed 5.6 3.4 8.9 7.3 3.7 11.0
1982’s composition -1.4 -3.4 -4.9 0.8 -4.9 -4.1
1995’s composition -6.3 -6.6 -12.9 3.0 -7.1 -4.1
2006’s composition -3.8 -16.2 -19.9 6.9 -10.2 -3.2
27Table 6: Collective agreement: Proportion of workers covered
By type:
year All IRC ACT CCT PRT AE No IRC
1982-1986 .97 .067 .79 .031 .088 .028
1987-1991 .98 .043 .81 .048 .086 .018
1992-1996 .98 .039 .82 .057 .064 .018
1997-1999 .96 .035 .83 .048 .045 .038
2000 .97 .036 .84 .045 .042 .032
2002 .95 .037 .83 .048 .037 .050
2003 .95 .036 .82 .060 .035 .052
2004 .93 .033 .80 .060 .038 .071
2005 .91 .030 .78 .060 .035 .090
2006 .90 .031 .78 .061 .032 .101
Notes: Before 2000, the reported values are averages of the corre-
sponding periods. IRC – Collective agreement instruments; ACT –
Collective agreement (signed by unions and a group of ﬁrms); CCT
– Collective contract (signed by unions and employers associations);
AE – Firm-level agreement; PRT – Regulatory edict issued unilater-
ally by the Ministry of Employment to speciﬁc sectors/regions where
there is no collective negotiation.
Table 7: Counterfactual analysis: Collective bargaining, log points ×100





2000’s composition 6.77 4.75
2006’s composition 6.54 4.91
Females
Observed 7.74 2.49
2000’s composition 6.16 1.85




2000’s composition -3.80 -0.53
2006’s composition -3.42 -0.32
Females
Observed 4.57 5.76
2000’s composition 4.57 5.95
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Figure 1: Log wage distribution percentile changes, 1982-2006 (M/F). Source: Quadros de
Pessoal data for 1982 and 2006, full-time workers aged 16 to 65 with 0 to 39 years of potential
experience. Full-time workers are those who worked 35-plus hours per week and earned at least


























































Figure 2: Log wage distribution percentile changes, Males (left panel), Females (right panel);






































1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
Log wages (Males) Log wage residuals (Males)
Log wages (Females) Log wage residuals (Females)
Figure 3: The evolution of the standard deviation of log-wages and log-wage residuals (M/F).
Regressions control for ﬁve education categories, eight age categories, and all possible interac-















































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
ano
Base 50/10 Base hourly 50/10
Total 50/10 Total hourly 50/10
Base 90/50 Base hourly 90/50
Total 90/50 Total hourly 90/50
Figure 4: Log wage ratios 90/50 and 50/10 based on diﬀerent measures of wages: base wages,
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Observed college/non−college wage gap
Katz−Murphy predicted wage gap: 1984−2006 trend
Figure 5: Top panel: College/noncollege relative supply and wage diﬀerential. The composi-
tion adjusted college wage premium is calculated using QP data, sorted into gender-education-
potential experience groups. We have two gender, ﬁve education and four potential experience
groups. Mean log wages for broader groups in each year represent weighted averages of the
relevant cell means using a ﬁxed set of weights equal to the mean share of total employment
by each group over 1984-2006. The detrended supply and wage series are the residuals from
separate OLS regressions of the relative supply and relative wage measures on a constant and
a linear trend. Bottom panel: Prediction for the college/noncollege wage gap. The predicted
wage gap is the ﬁtted values from an OLS regression of the college/noncollege wage gap for the
years 1984 to 2006 on a constant and the college/noncollege relative supply measure (Column
(1) of Table 2). The college/noncollege log relative supply index is the logarithm of the ratio of





































































































Figure 6: Left panel: Composition-adjusted log relative college/noncollege wage gap by poten-
tial experience. Right panel: Composition-adjusted log relative college/noncollege supply by
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Figure 7: Wage growth rates by wage percentiles for the total of the economy and the textile
sector. Source: Social Security, 2006-2007. The percentiles were computed separately for each
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
1982: f(w | skills) 1995: f(w | skills)
2006: f(w | skills) Observed ratio
Females 50/10
Figure 8: Actual and counterfactual 90/50 and 50/10 overall wage inequality, QP 1982-2006.
The series labeled “Observed ratio” present the actual log diﬀerence between the percentiles
in the data. The series labeled “Year: f(w — skills)” corresponds to the log diﬀerence of the
percentiles of a reweighted (counterfactual) distribution of year “Year” where the weights are
proportional to the distribution of skills (age, schooling, and interactions) in each year depicted
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Females 50/10
Figure 9: Actual and counterfactual 90/50 and 50/10 residual wage inequality, QP 1982-2006.
The series labeled “Observed ratio” correspond to the diﬀerence between the percentiles of the
residual distribution of an OLS regression of log wages on 8 age dummies, 5 education levels
dummies, and all corresponding interaction terms. For the meaning of the remaining series see















































Figure 10: Change in occupation’s employment shares by occupational skill percentile. The
ﬁgure plots log changes in employment shares by 1982 and 1996 occupational skill percentile
rank using a locally weighted smoothing regression (with bandwidth 0.8). We consider two
measures of occupational skill: (i) the employment-weighted percentile rank of the occupation’s
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Figure 11: Change in real wages, by wage percentile. See notes to Figure 1.
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